Unwinding Ariadne's Identity Thread: Privacy Risks with Fitness Trackers and Online Social Networks by Aktypi, Angeliki et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Aktypi, Angeliki and Nurse, Jason R. C. and Goldsmith, Michael  (2017) Unwinding Ariadne's
Identity Thread: Privacy Risks with Fitness Trackers and Online Social Networks.    In: International
Workshop on Multimedia Privacy and Security in conjunction with the 24th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communication Security (CCS 2017), October 30, 2017, Dallas, Texas, USA.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3137616.3137617




Unwinding Ariadne’s Identity Thread:
Privacy Risks with Fitness Trackers and Online Social Networks
Angeliki Aktypi












The recent expansion of Internet of Things (IoT) and the grow-
ing trends towards a healthier lifestyle, have been followed by a
proliferation in the use of itness-trackers in our daily life. These
wearable IoT devices combined with the extensive use by individu-
als of Online Social Networks (OSNs) have raised many security
and privacy concerns. Individuals enrich the content of their online
posts with their physical performance and attendance at sporting
events, without considering the plausible risks that this may result
in. This paper aims to examine the potential exposure of users’
identity that is caused by information that they share online and
personal data that are stored by their itness-trackers. We approach
the privacy concerns that arise by building an interactive tool. This
tool models online information shared by individuals and elaborates
on how they might be exposed to the unwanted leakage of further
personal data. The tool also illustrates the privacy risks that arise
from information that people expose, which could be exploited by
malicious parties such as fraudsters, stalkers and other online and
oline criminals. To understand the level of users’ awareness con-
cerning their identity exposure when engaging with such devices
and online services, we also have conducted a qualitative analysis
and present our indings here.
CCS CONCEPTS
· Security and privacy→ Privacy protections; · Information
systems → Data mining; · Human-centered computing →
Visualization toolkits; Empirical studies in HCI;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging research topic that
attracts the attention of both the academic community and the
industrial sector. We are on the cusp of a revolution on connectivity
where the end-users can interact with a vast number of devices and
platforms redeining their daily life. A total of 15.4 billion connec-
ted devices were already installed in 2015 and this is expected to
continue, with an estimate of 30.7 billion and 75.4 billion connected
devices by the years 2020 and 2025, respectively [33]. The newly
introduced connections and recently developed capabilities, such
as opening and closing a home’s front-door from distance by using
a smartphone, blur the boundaries between the virtual and the
physical world.
We are entering a novel scientiic era that departs from the ex-
isting technological status-quo and goes far beyond it, shifting the
way in which we interact with devices and with each other. IoT
does not only correspond to the new connections that are emerging
but it is more about the launch of an ubiquitous technology. In this
paradigm, data is automatically collected, generated and shared
and the devices learn about consumers by observing their habits,
tendencies, and preferences. Furthermore, these smart devices are
constantly monitoring the environment through sensors and dy-
namically making decisions and changes in real time [60].
However, even if it is ultimately appealing to make these devices
part of our life, convinced by their intelligence and promises for
a better life, the potential laws and vulnerabilities that perhaps
accompany them are putting the end-user at a remarkable risk of
cyberattacks. Several case studies from diferent researchers [5, 21]
have discovered that a signiicant number of IoT devices do not use
traic encryption or strong authentication and, in addition, appear
to be exposed to common vulnerabilities.
The greatest concern does not arise from the isolated study of
those security breaches in each device that we use but from the
accumulation and the quest for correlations between the inform-
ation gathered from diferent resources. Two good examples are
illustrated in [14, 42] where the authors analyse the digital footprint
that we create through our use of portable technology devices and
systems log-iles. Ultimately, they could use these to infer private
and social relationships between the device owners, using a range
of similarity metrics.
The problem is even more salient if we also consider the way
that end-users interact with their devices. Most of the time they
bypass documentation, driven by their low concern for privacy
or the lack of comprehension of privacy notices [39], and become
bound to conditions of which they have little awareness. Although
individuals value privacy and nominally mind personal data dis-
closure, they neither employ privacy precautions nor restrict the
information they share on-line. This is what once more brings the
Privacy Paradox [61] to the surface.
All the above factors attest that privacy remains one of the major
concerns of IoT. Lack of supervision of personal data propaga-
tion and dissemination results in sensitive information leakages
that question users’ trust as far as connected IoT devices are con-
cerned [62]. Security and especially privacy issues are stated as
the Achilles heel for the IoT industry [17], establishing them as its
major obstacles towards its expansion.
This paper studies the potential exposure of users’ identity that
is caused by information that they share online and personal data
that are stored by their itness-trackers. Our contribution is two-
fold. First, we develop an identity-exposure tool which seeks to
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determine the leakage of information related to each user’s identity.
This tool is initiated by data shared both on OSNs and by wearable
IoT devices, and adds further value by also presenting potential
privacy risks. Hopefully, the correlated illustration of the inferred
elements will help users and interested stakeholders better assess
their online digital footprints. Thus, they will be more capable of
making informed privacy decisions.
In many ways, we regard our work as the natural progression
from related work in online identity exposure [10, 13, 25]. However,
in our research we do not limit our scope to the security and privacy
concerns that arise by derivations only on OSNs, but we expand
it to the IoT context and especially to wearable itness tracking
devices. We decided to focus on this speciic category of connected
devices driven by their high popularity among users [28] and the
functionalities that they can provide with a variety of sensors. We
are not aware of any other work that attempts to create such a tool
for assessing a user’s consequential risk exposure in such domains.
Our second contribution is a relective user-based study where
we attempt to shed light on the level of users’ awareness concerning
their identity-exposure when engaging with wearable devices and
OSNs. Additionally, we have examined the efectiveness of our tool
in visualising identity exposure risks and in allowing users to gain
some understanding of the low of personal data. This data can
derive from using diferent connected devices in the interconnected
world or from engaging with OSNs.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature concerning previous related work on iden-
tities across both the online and oline domains. Section 3, then,
describes our novel, identity-exposure tool that seeks to fuse all the
identity attributes that can be extracted primarily from wearable
IoT devices and OSNs into a comprehensive and systematic model.
Section 4 continues by presenting the methodology adopted and the
results received from our empirical investigation concerning users’
awareness of privacy risks and tool’s efectiveness of achieving
our goal. Finally, in Section 5 we consider possibilities for further
research steps and we conclude our work.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Identity exposure in OSNs
Users’ di culty following and observing the information that con-
cerns them in cyberspace, especially when the digital and physical
world converge, can lead to the exposure of their identity without
their consent. A critical data resource to retrieve personal data is
Online Social Networks (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn) where
the substantial personalised data that users publish can provide
deep insights into their private lives. Previous work has addressed
the privacy concerns raised within OSNs related to users’ identity
exposure.
Krasnova et al. in their study [30] demonstrated that concerns
about organizational threats (e.g., bullying, stalking) and social
threats (e.g., data collection by the OSN provider, information use
by third parties) constitute two underlying dimensions of the łPri-
vacy Concerns in Online Social Networksž. These construct and
have an impact on users’ self-presentation strategies. In particu-
lar, users tend to reduce the amount of information disclosed and
become more conscious about the information they reveal as a re-
sponse to their concerns regarding organizational and social threats,
respectively.
In Creese et al. [13], the authors present a novel data-reachability
matrix that facilitates the assessment of personal information that
is either directly shared online by users or inferred from their
correlation. It has also been argued that the functional locations
(i.e., home, work, leisure and transport) of human activities can be
traced with relatively high accuracy by low density geo-location
data from tweets while using visual or textual representations; in
which case the former techniques perform better than the latter
ones [32].
An innovative system that provides tailor-made feedback about
online identity exposure, has been designed by Emanuel et al. [16].
In that instance, those authors have considered the work in [25],
which refers to a mathematical model that investigates individuals
superidentities. The concept of superidentities focuses attention
on the aftermath of the combination of measures across online
and oline contexts so that identity in one domain can be cross-
referenced with identity in the other.
As the digital horizon is continuing to expand and big data ana-
lysis and machine learning techniques are becoming more mature,
the level of granularity of each user’ digital footprint is more prom-
inent. It has been proven [41] that it is not only possible to intercept
elements for a person’s identity from online material but it is also
feasible to distinguish between real and fake online identities based
on how normal (or łnaturalž) their persona appears.
In view of everything that has been mentioned so far, it is sugges-
ted that our presence on OSN leaves enough trails to reveal our true
physical identity. Under certain circumstances the ability to track
identity elements with high accuracy can be proven to be beneicial.
A good example is the application of such a methodology by law
enforcement where police analysts undertake the task of analysing
and processing data throughout the criminal investigation [12].
However, concerns arise when these monitoring capabilities are
used either by the government for surveillance of citizens [7] or by
adversaries in cyberspace for attacking online users [35].
2.2 Security and privacy issues in the IoT
The ubiquity and dominance of technology in our lives has been
accompanied by many security and privacy challenges that are
raising concerns related to users’ identity exposure even higher.
Pervasive computing devices that allow identity and context in-
formation to be gathered, stored and exchanged easily are rapidly
emerging. Under this regime, personal privacy might be sacriiced
to a greater extent than ever before. However, as argued in [65],
users tend to have diferent privacy preferences and to apply diver-
gent mitigation techniques to preserve their identity, quite often
not related to one another. On top of that, the demanding task
of managing and processing the immense volume of data that is
generated causes doubt towards potential data leakages of personal
information. As demonstrated in [52], it is feasible that personal
data can leak from a Smart Home environment that uses encrypted
communications, by performing information leakage attacks and
applying machine learning techniques.
Prior studies [44] have reported that users are łextremelyž or
łsomewhatž worried about the exposure of their personal data,
suggesting that privacy concerns could be a signiicant barrier to the
growth of the IoT. In [24], the authors have tried to integrate the user
in the data-propagation chain between diferent connected devices
in order to address the lack of transparency of IoT applications. They
implement a trust-feedback toolkit that evaluates trust perception
of end-users in simulated and real IoT systems. In such a way
industrial developers of IoT technologies could be informed about
users’ security and privacy preferences and ensure their trust and
acceptance.
Researchers in [6] identifying users’ privacy concerns have tried
to gain initial insights into users’ perceptions of data transactions
around the BitBarista connected cofee-machine. The study emphas-
ises that increasing transparency of data transactions helps towards
gaining users’ trust. In addition, it corroborates users’ discomfort
and anxiety around data gathering that is interwoven with their
conception of IoT systems. Furthermore, it has been shown [54] that
users’ decisions about whether to disclose contextual information
(current location, activity and social surrounding) are afected not
only by the sensitivity of the disclosed information itself, but also
by the purpose for collecting the data.
2.3 Security and privacy issues in wearable IoT
The rapidly emerging trend of łsensor maniaž in the IoT ecosystem
[57] is raising more privacy concerns. Nowadays, users perform
a more reined 24/7 monitoring of their activities, performances
and preferences taking advantage of a proliferation of wearable
IoT devices such as sport trackers and smart-watches. In [6], the
authors draw attention to this newly introduced trend of łquantiied
selfž where people are tracking every facet of their lives with the
aid of technology, establishing it as remarkable source of personal
data leakages.
The neglected security aspect on the design of those connected
devices [3, 49] facilitates the processing and collection of personal
information elevating higher the risk of exposing users’ identity
data without their consent. The privacy risks emanate from both
the way that these huge amounts of personal data are transmitted
though diferent platforms; and the way that they are collected and
stored by the organisations that host them.
In many cases the wearable itness tracking devices are used in
conjunction with a base-station or a smartphone application and a
cloud distribution or a web server, introducing many attack vectors
on the communication between the parties involved. In [48, 64]
the authors evaluate the security and privacy properties of Fitbit,
a itness-tracker which also has online social network access and
propose means to eliminate the vulnerabilities identiied. A similar
security assessment is also presented in [11], where nine itness
wristbands, along with the corresponding Android applications,
were monitored in live operation. The results obtained from the
analysis revealed that there is abundant room for further progress
in securing wearable devices, as authentication and encryption
mechanisms are implemented poorly or not at all.
Unfortunately, as previously stated, privacy concerns do not
arise only from technical security breaches of the wearable devices
and their communication with cooperative third parties. The data
produced is regularly handled and hosted on the servers of itness
companies, so users are subjected to their applied administration
privacy policy. It is worth mentioning that wearable devices may
not be covered by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) Rules. Consequently, consumers may be providing
consent for their health data to be used by non-HIPAA-covered
entities without knowing exactly how their data will be collected,
protected, and used [19]. The study demonstrated in [34] and its
preliminary technical report [47] analyse a variety of applications
as to whether they are compliant with their terms and conditions
or not. It reveals that Runkeeper was sending users’ personal data
to third parties when it was not in use, without their consent. In
addition, the analysis also inds that from the Runkeeper’s privacy
policy declaration it was unclear whether the application deletes
personal data routinely or when the users request it or delete their
account.
All of the above-mentioned security breaches have set the scene
for a range of potential privacy risks. In [23] the authors have
examined the privacy and security properties of eight of the most
popular itness-trackers. They identify their security vulnerabilities
and elaborate the risks they introduce to the users. A more recently
released study [40] focuses on the current digital health marketing
practices that take advantage of the "connected-health" system that
is formed bywearables, and threaten the privacy of consumer health
information. It also ofers suggestions on how diferent sectors such
as the government and the industry can work together to propose
adequate federal laws to safeguard personal health information
data collected by wearables.
The goal of our study is to address the privacy issues that arise
when users engage with both the IoT domain by using wearable
IoT devices in particular, and OSNs. The research tests the hy-
pothesis that the signiicant personal information that is stored
on the wearable IoT devices and shared on OSNs, can infer other
personal characteristics related to users’ identity. Hence, we have
built an interactive tool that describes users’ identity exposure by
combining online data from these two sources and identiies po-
tential risks that users might face. To understand the level of users’
awareness concerning the leakage of their private information and
to draw conclusions about the efectiveness of our tool, we have
subsequently conducted a qualitative analysis. Throughout this
user-based study we performed interviews with eight participants
and in the following sections we elaborate on our indings.
3 IDENTITY-EXPOSURE TOOL
In order to examine users’ potential identity exposure, we have
designed and developed an interactive tool. The tool is initiated by
data that is stored by wearables (entered by the user or calculated
by the device based on the user’s information and activity) and
information that is posted on OSNs. We choose to combine these
two diferent domains motivated by the great amount of private
data that are communicated through them and that can be used as
information sources for identity data leakages. Our main thought
was that despite the increased attention that has been given to
the security and privacy aspect within OSNs following their es-
tablished presence in our lives, security is still neglected within
the newly evolving IoT domain. To narrow the scope of our study
Figure 1: The worklow of our identity-exposure tool
we have chosen to focus on wearable devices driven by the highly
conidential and identity-related personal data that those devices
are handling.
In the past, previous work [13] has investigated how data may
be aggregated across OSNs to highlight additional risks. For our
study, we consider the incorporation of both the private information
posted on users’ OSN proiles and the personal data stored on their
wearable IoT devices. We assume that this data-mining could be
available to malicious parties for exploitation. Such an event could
occur via security breaches or due to the users’ choice to share
publicly their posts on OSNs. Another possibility could be users
unknowingly or knowingly consenting to companies’ privacy terms
and conditions that allow them to trade their information to third
parties.
3.1 Overview of the Tool
Our tool is completely agnostic of any OSN or IoT device, therefore
meaning that any speciic wearable device can be added and used.
Its usage is demonstrated in the worklow in Figure 1. Users interact
directly with the tool by providing input at two diferent moments.
In the core of the tool there is a general taxonomy, illustrated in
tool’s component A (see Figure 1) that functions as a retrieval
database. This general taxonomy contains the identity attributes
that users might be expected to share (e.g., name, location) based
on the OSNs that they participate in and the wearables they use.
We delineate its main features and describe the process that we
follow for its deinition in the following subsection 3.2.
As an initial step in the tool, users are expected to tailor the
identity attributes to their context by specifying the diferent OSNs
in which they are members and the wearables, in particular itness-
trackers, that are in their possession. The tool automatically cus-
tomises the general taxonomy based on users’ choices and builds
a personalised one, depicted in tool’s component B (see Figure 1).
Based on the customised taxonomy the tool later allows visual-
isation of the risks faced by the user, an illustration which can
be seen in component C that is built around three diferent axes.
We elaborate further on these in the subsection 3.3. The second
interaction point and the last illustration, depicted in component
D, are optional. Their goal is to help the user to navigate across the
diferent risks in a more eicient way and understand them better.
This is also explained further in that subsection.
3.2 Taxonomy
The initial step of our study was the creation of a taxonomy to
categorise all the available identity attributes that can be collected
from the OSNs and IoT, in particular wearable IoT domains. This
classiication allows us to determine the digital traits that can be
leveraged to yield a more detailed picture about an online user’s
identity.
To deine our taxonomy, we used a grounded theory (GT) ap-
proach. Originating in the ield of sociology, GT has become a
popular research method through which new frameworks, mod-
els and theories can be developed by a process of data-gathering,
categorisation and coding, followed by various comparative and
theoretical analyses of indings [63]. As a research method, it is
highly appreciated for its proximity to the data as well as its ability
to identify and group themes [53]. To this end, we use it for our
study, although the construction of a taxonomy is not one of its
typical applications.
For our research, we have studied various academic publica-
tions relevant to identity exposure through the use of OSNs (e.g.,
[13, 25, 32]). We have also examined several industry-based reports
and media articles concerning the privacy risks caused by the use
of wearable and similar IoT devices (e.g., [6, 20, 34, 51]). Finally, in
order to relect the already existing perils, we have paid consider-
able attention on studying the capabilities of the state-of-the-art
wearable devices and itness-trackers applications that are currently
available to the end-users in the market (for instance, [18, 46, 56]).
Hence, we have created a taxonomy that demonstrates the ele-
ments that compose the digital footprint generated for an individual
while engaging with diferent aspects of the digital world, both the
OSNs and the wearable IoT devices. Figure 2 illustrates the two
subnodes of the central digital footprint node on which our study
is focused. In more detail, the resulting hierarchy contains three
Figure 2: An example of a user’s customised taxonomy
distinct levels, with the top-level representing the two domains of
OSNs and IoT on which our study is focused, and the level below
showing a subdivision within each domain. For the OSNs domain
we have identiied diferent networks of which the user might be a
member, using their oicial logos for their visual representation,
whereas for the IoT domain we have highlighted diferent groups
of connected devices. Finally, the last elements of the hierarchy are
the actual identity attributes that can explicitly be captured, for
example the birthday, height, steps counted and heart-rate within
the wearable "space".
The application of GT helped us identify the newly emerging
trend of OSNs speciically dedicated to athletes. Fitness applications
(e.g., Strava, Runkeeper) and online dashboard platforms designed
by the itness-trackers companies and dedicated to the community
of their customers (e.g., Polar Flow, Suunto Movescount), exceed
self-tracking and personal analytics functionalities. The additional
capabilities that they are providing, interaction with other users,
uploading of photos, sharing personal posts to name but a few are
imitating the ones commonly encountered on OSN. The conceptual
interpretation of such competences leads us to initially develop and
then reine our taxonomy categorising them under the group of
OSNs, even though they are part of the "quantiied self" system.
One important aspect of the taxonomy is the fact that it allows
control of idelity around the elements of identity by using diferent
illustrations. Thus, steel-blue illed circles have been used to indicate
the elements that are explicitly necessary for the creation of an
online account or the use of a wearable. Furthermore, dark-grey
illed circles have been used to illustrate data that are optional and
therefore each user decides whether they are going to be entered or
used. Finally, turquoise illed circles are used for showing elements
that are measured by the wearables or the platforms based on the
input data and users’ activity.
3.3 Inferences and Risks
Simply having a set of identity attributes is not enough to give rise
to causes for concerns about identity exposure. As outlined above,
the main motivational question was what kind of previously un-
known elements of identity could be communicated either directly
or through correlation from a wide range of input. In particular,
we have focused both on the isolated and the aggregative study of
the several identity attributes that are shared within the domain
of wearable IoT devices and OSNs. Also, our parallel objective was
to investigate the kind of privacy risks that users encounter, pos-
sibly without knowing. To this end, we introduce the second core
concept of our tool: the inferences and the derived risks.
We have based our postulations on already published academic
and industrial research evidence and general knowledge in the ield.
To illustrate and communicate our indings to the user we have
used a visualisation depicted in Figure 3. As we can observe it is
divided into three main columns: the irst one contains the identity
attributes that are speciied by the user’s customised taxonomy.
Those identity attributes are used individually or in conjunction
with others (indicated with aggregation symbols) to infer other
identity characteristics of the user, thus forming the second column
of the illustration. Finally, the risks that are a broader consideration
of all the identity attributes that might be gathered or used by
someone else to potentially invade the privacy of a person constitute
the third column of the illustration. Sequences of arrows indicate
how the surveyed data point(s) can be projected to reach inferences
and exploited for signiicant risks to arise.
To facilitate navigation, a search auto-complete widget has been
added to ilter the identity attributes that are of most interest to
the user. All of the identiied risks related to the attributes are
displayed on a provided list. The user can select a risk and ask
for clariication of it. Then, emerging popup windows will provide
more information concerning the risk and its potential mitigation
techniques. In Figure 4, an example of iltered data and of a risk
clariication based on a user’s request is portrayed.
To give an example of the inferences made and the risks iden-
tiied, we now consider a few of them and subsequently present
Figure 3: Excerpt of identiied inferences and risks
them in detail. In order not to detract from the overall discussion of
the tool we keep this presentation brief, hence the inferences and
risks outlined in this section capture only a subset of the overall
ones demonstrated by our tool. It should be noted that the value of
the tool is in the approach, not speciically the values with which
it is populated.
The irst risk, identiied in Figure 3, is that of inancial loss
due to home burglary, especially targeting high-income neighbour-
hoods. The possibility to map the route of a run can easily expose
someone’s home address as normally it will be the starting and
ending point of the distance covered. The disclosure of a user’s
home location can be even more precise if the data from the wear-
able’s altimeter sensor were used that could reveal the loor where
someone lives. Furthermore, users’ past sporting activity could di-
vulge their behavioural patterns, particularly the time slots when
they are away from home. Thus, potential thieves would have all
the information they might need to perform their criminal actions
without the fear of exposing themselves. Social media have already
been identiied as a great source of careless public exposure of
personal data to criminals [27]. The combination of the publicly
accessible data on OSNs with the data obtained by itness-trackers
can make the available information more precise and raise the level
of the privacy threat that their users encounter.
Figure 4: An example of iltered data and the clariication
of a risk based on a user’s request
In addition, another risk that we described is the one of stalking.
Fitness social application platforms provide users with the ability
to observe their activity surroundings with multiple functionalit-
ies ofered on them. For example, Strava "Flyby" and Runkeeper
"Live Track" features enable users to identify other individuals they
crossed paths with on their activity and broadcast live their route,
respectively. It is the constant broadcasting of users’ presence that
makes those fears reported in [38], realistic since someone can
easily trace the whereabouts of another person.
Furthermore, the risk of proiling is signiicantly high with all
the personal data that are stored and communicated. Attendance
at sports events or participation in sport challenges together with
friend lists allow intuitions about users’ health condition and social
contacts. Furthermore, new companies such as BioBeats [8] have
begun to appear in the market providing predictive insights into
individual’s health and well-being by tracking data from wearable
and smartphone sensors. In particular, they are using users’ heart-
rate variability (HRV), that is, a measure of how variable heart-
rate is over time, as an indicator of stress, potentially revealing
something of users’ mental health [4].
Regarding the work sector, the risks are signiicant for some em-
ployees in case their wearable’s data leak to their future or present
employers. It has been reported that obesity-related illnesses cost
American businesses $73.1 billion per year in medical expenses
and lost productivity [40]. In addition, many debates have been
made about pregnancy and hiring discrimination due to employers’
intention to avoid maternity leave [15]. Thus one might argue that
in the future, wearables and the data that they collect may afect
applicants’ acceptance for advertised job positions. This data may
be gathered from a wearable in two example cases. For instance, a
wearable may calculate a user’s body mass index (BMI) based on
weight and height and that data may be used to infer or diagnose
obesity [45]. Or, the wearable may predict pregnancy likelihood
based on the reality that resting heart-rates are increased by 30-50%
in pregnant women [22].
It has been already reported [37] that companies around the
world are analysing applicants’ proile on OSNs. This is an act
that it is in accordance with the law in the US and in most of
the EU member states under certain circumstances. Hence, the
enrichment of a user’s personal proile with information gathered
by their wearable is enabling the human resources sector to obtain
more information with higher precision concerning applicants or
employees lives.
Also, the list of personal goals and the sport performances logs
can raise privacy concerns by revealing personal interests and the
health condition of an individual. As stated in [40], these factors can
lead to manipulative marketing as some individuals will be ofered
bargains or discounts, whereas others might be given less favour-
able treatment as they may have a low lifetime-revenue potential.
Also, users may experience increased yearly premiums for their
health insurance in case the prospect of sufering from an illness
is characterised considerably high. IoT devices in general, and in
particular wearable itness-trackers, might be used for providing in-
sights for insurance companies that are trying to create more detailed
risk proiles of their clients based on their behaviour [43, 51].
Special programmes that ofer clients signiicant discounts for
purchasing expensive wearables and rewards for tracking their
activity have already made their appearance in the market [58].
However, there has been no holistic, detailed approach to the cir-
cumstance as only the positive rewarding consequences have been
underlined and no attention has been paid to the negative ones. The
reality is that discounts can quickly become surcharges following
clients’ daily routine and companies’ risk-averse policy.
Finally, we have underlined the important risk of identity theft.
Researchers have underlined the possibility to infer the social se-
curity number (SSN) from individuals’ personal information, that is,
their date and state of birth, in particular [1]. Furthermore, studies
[59] suggest that personally identiiable information can be used
for targeted online password guessing as users tend to utilise this
kind of information for the creation of their credentials.
This completes our brief description of the tool and how it could
support users. As we observed diferent identity attributes known
a priori can lead to similar derivations, while there is also the
case of multiple attributes being necessary to produce just one
inferred element. Certainly, the greater the number of target identity
attributes required to reach an inferred element and the greater
the uncertainty of their entry by the user is, the less probability
for a risk to rise exists. Conversely, more reliable derivatives are
produced when an inferred element can be reached from multiple
sources, where alternative choices can be used in the absence of
another or as a conirmation or comparative measure.
4 USER-BASED STUDY
The development of our tool was followed by an initial user-based
study. The purpose of this study was to test the utility of the tool.
Firstly, we examined users’ awareness of how their identity might
be exposed when they engage with wearable IoT devices and OSNs.
This allowed us to understand their basic knowledge before enga-
ging with the tool. Secondly, we introduced participants to the tool
and asked for their opinions on how useful it could be at gaining a
better understanding of the privacy risks. In this section, we present
the methodology that we have applied and the indings from this
work.
4.1 Methodology
Our empirical data stems from the thematic analysis of semi-struc-
tured interviews with a sample of eight participants. Interviewees
were recruited individually though invitations, lyers, advertise-
ments on social media and by word-of-mouth. There were no cri-
teria for inclusion other than that all the participants were expected
to be owners of wearable IoT devices which were used regularly,
either for their work or for their pleasure and convenience. They
were also expected to have some social media presence, given that
we were looking to correlate data from social media and wearables
in our tool. The main motivation was to investigate the general
public’s awareness of online privacy risks, hence for our sample we
excluded people with background in security that could introduce
a bias in our results.
Our sample contained four females and four males ranged in age
from 25 to 40, the majority of whom were based in the UK. Their
educational backgrounds varied from irst degree to doctorate and
their occupations included postgraduate students, data scientists
and university oicials. As dictated by our selection criteria, all of
them were using various types of itness-trackers such as Fitbit
Charge 2, Polar V800, Polar M400, Apple Watch (1st and 2nd gen-
eration) and Suunto Ambit, which provided a diverse set of user
experiences.
A Central University Research Ethics Committee approval was
obtained prior to the beginning of data collection. All the inter-
views were conducted during June 2017 and performed in person or
over Skype. They lasted between 30 and 45 minutes and they were
audio-recorded with the participants’ permission. In the course
of the study sessions participants elaborated on their risk percep-
tion while using their itness-tracker and their apprehension of
the łquantiied selfž system, in general. They also listed the per-
sonal information that they are happy to share on OSNs or store
on their wearable IoT device, or else deliberately hide, stating the
reason that explains their decision. Relecting on their responses
and utilising our identity tool, we presented them with the poten-
tial risks that they may be subject to by using their wearable, and
we observed their emotional reactions. Finally, we discussed the
countermeasures that they were willing to take soon after realising
the possibility of their identity being exposed and their privacy
being compromised.
To analyse our data, we employed a thematic analysis approach
[9]. This qualitative analytic method when simpliied, consists of
identifying codes and introducing themes among the collected data.
Codes help to the categorisation of the gathered sample into mean-
ingful groups by highlighting interesting semantic or latent content.
Subsequently, themes are acting as umbrella terms for certain codes
[50] by capturing important meaning within the data in relation to
the research question. The following subsection reports our identi-
ied themes.
4.2 Findings and Discussion
Prior to our discussion, the majority of participants had paid little
attention to the risks that might occur as a result of the usage of
their wearable device. We found that several diferent factors have
given them conidence that their privacy is not at risk. One of them
was the options available on online sites that provide them with
the possibility to preserve their privacy by selecting with whom
they share their data. Another factor was the explicit questions
throughout the signing up process that ask for their consent in
order for their data to be shared with third parties. Also, the trust
that such device companies have built throughout the years in
the market appeared to have the same impact. Interestingly, one
participant reported that the amount of data collected from these
devices is insigniicant compared to the immense volume of data
that are produced for each individual in our big data era. This
in some ways suggests that this risk vector might be of minor
importance to some. He stated:
There is just a massive amount of data out there and
the information that would come from my device
would be just a drop in the ocean.
Aminority of the participants indicated that they have connected
their wearables with other OSNs such as Facebook or linked them
with other itness applications such as Strava. From their responses
it was deduced that they tend to separate their itness activity from
their online social life. As for wearable dashboard sites that ofer
OSN features, interviewees mentioned that they use themmainly to
keep a record of their physical performance and not to interact with
other users. In that sense, two participants expressed the desire for
software that could be installed locally on their personal computers
and help them analyse their itness data. This would be instead of
them being obliged to use the online dashboard site that is provided
by the company of their wearable. As noted by one of the two:
I would have preferred the software to be just on my
laptop because I just put the data on this website so
as to have a record of the exercise I have done, for
example. I do not really care about sharing this kind
of stuf which is the reason why I am not on Strava.
A recurrent theme in the interviewswas the participants’ attitude
that their health data are less valuable than their inancial details to
cyber criminals. In addition, the interviewees argued that it seemed
very di cult their information to reach third parties that could use
it for harm in case of a security breach. An apt quote was:
In my mind I think, well if you had my bank in-
formation what damage could you do to me? You
could steal my money. If you had my health inform-
ation data, let’s say, if you knewmy heart rate, what
could you do to me? It seems there is less risk in this
occasion.
In reality however, it is reported [55] that the physical itness
information that is stored on wearables is worth ten times that of a
credit card on the black market. The personal nature of this kind of
data, increase both their value and the magnitude of their exchange
between diferent illegal parties [36].
An important issue that emerged from the analytic process was
interviewees’ inability to associate themselves with the risk that
might occur in cyberspace, given that they were not aware of sim-
ilar incidents that have happened to people they knew. This can
be related to the inefective information that is communicated by
security incident notiication mechanisms [29], that leave the vic-
tims of data breaches among the last ones to learn about incidents
afecting them. This oblivious approach diminishes the attention
that users are paying to protect their privacy in cyberspace as they
believe that incidents like these are targeting special users and not
users such as themselves. A participant stated:
I feel the risk is small, we always talk about the
possibility of these security breaches to happen but
I do not know anyone who has ever experienced
something like that.
Almost two-thirds of the participants stated that the way their
data are stored and whether companies take actions to maintain
anonymity or not, is unclear to them. In addition, over half of those
interviewed highlighted that they were feeling a little lost con-
cerning the massive amount of measurements that are happening
in the background simultaneously. They also expressed concerns
that there might be more data collected than they are aware of.
Something like that could be possible either by the use of unlisted
sensors on the devices [26] or by the application of data-mining
techniques where other information could be accurately inferred
by data provided initially, such as in our tool. This is summarised:
There are so many parameters and things that you
just get overwhelmed by the amount of what the
wearable can do and measure.
Of the study population, the minority of participants reported
that they have skimmed through the privacy terms and conditions
when signing up their device. Several issues were identiied as the
main reasons that dissuade them from devoting the time needed
to read the provided documentation. The participants appeared to
be negatively inluenced by the use of unfriendly language with
many legal terms and the lack of consideration of how private
all this collected information is. Furthermore, this proves already
documented issues [31] in relation to the great efort that users
have to make to interpret the privacy policies on diferent websites
and deine if they are in accordance with their privacy preferences.
One participant expressed this concern as follows:
No, I did not read the terms and conditions, it’s in le-
galese anyway so you are not really expected to read
it unless you hire a lawyer who will go through these
sixty pages or whatever, it’s not practical really.
A number of the participants stated that the considerable amount
of money that needs to be spent on purchasing such devices is also
crucial. Hence, this signiicant investment leaves little space to de-
cline the use of the device or return it due to concerns that occur
after reading the privacy policies. Finally, the majority of the parti-
cipants commented that they would feel more secure in case the
privacy terms and conditions were the outcome of the collabora-
tion between the government and the wearables companies. They
suggested that in such a case the document delivered would be
more trustworthy as criminal liability will be attributed whenever
users’ privacy would somehow be violated.
Concerning the data on their wearables, all the interviewees
reported that they have entered their age/birthday, height, weight
and gender as those are prerequisites for other data to be calculated
by the device such as the calories that they have burnt. The fact
that they wanted the resulted measurements to be as accurate as
possible made them not to lie about the information they provided.
Some of the participants reported that they also added optional
information such as their daily diet, led by their enthusiasm to make
the most out of all the built-in capabilities of their tracker. Similarly,
others stated that they have entered more detailed information
related to their health status, like allergies for example, in order to
instruct other people on how to help them in case an anaphylactic
shock occurs to them. They noted:
Well, you are buying the device for tracking stuf so
the tricky thing about that is that if you don’t insert
the appropriate information you are not going to
have accurate measurements.
When participants were presentedwith their respective risks that
we identiied with the aid of our tool, they found the risks presented
as credible and intriguing. We observed that the participants who
claimed to mind their privacy and have considered the irst level
of extracted risks such as the one of stalking. However, they were
indeed surprised with the more complexly inferred ones such as
the possibility of extracting their Social Security Number from their
birthday and their birthplace [1]. Even the interviewees who were
somewhat sceptical about the actual risks (because they argued that
these risks existed in the past prior to the era of IoT) recognised
that the technology made the ease of these attacks considerably
higher. One participant stated:
I had a rough idea, I knew it to a certain extent but I
had not put much thought to the deep network of the
risks and how these risks can really escalate when
you connect one risk to another.
Our tool received positive feedback by the overwhelming major-
ity of the participants and they stated that they would continue to
use it, and suggest it to others, if it was publicly available. We found
that even the individuals who were considering that there might be
risks while engaging with wearables did not have a clear picture of
the risks involved. They reported that our tool with its illustration
where the user can observe the data propagation and how this can
be maliciously used, made the unspeciied risks more tangible. They
also stated that it seemed interesting to have a tool that interprets
information and shows risks caused by multiple diferent online
sources instead of only one. As summarised by a participant:
This tool tells you that if you share this information,
this is where it can go and what else could be in-
ferred from that. Seeing this sort of network is quite
interesting.
In addition, they reported that both the tool illustration and the
mitigation techniques proposed for each risk could be helpful for
the users. Thus, they could still store their data on their wearable but
also be more conscious about what they do, both by specifying who
can have access to them or by reviewing the information they share
on other sites. Hence, they could achieve their privacy without
exposing their identity while beneiting from all the functionalities
of their devices.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have presented our identity-exposure tool that
seeks to determine the leakage of information related to users’ iden-
tity resulting from their engagement with wearable IoT devices, in
particular itness-trackers and OSNs, in parallel. We have demon-
strated that the plausible risks are essential and must be taken into
consideration when users interact with such devices and engage
with OSNs. The qualitative analysis that we performed showed
that users’ awareness, concerning the risks encountered, can be
characterised as low and that the usage of an interactive tool such
as the one we have developed could help them identify the risks
better and adopt proposed mitigation techniques to safeguard their
privacy.
We consider this work somewhat to be an initial step of a broader
study that tries to identify and raise awareness about the privacy
issues arising in the emerging IoT era. As a following step, we are
planning to enrich our tool by identifying further inferences for the
data points already presented. We are also working towards expand-
ing the scope of the tool with a view to incorporating information
from other IoT domains such as Building & Home Automation and
Smart Cities, which are also expected to host signiicant private
data of the users.
As already presented, the tool is currently stating the postu-
lations that are identiied by us, or proposed in the literature, in
order to assess individuals’ online digital footprints. Our ultimate
objective is to integrate the diferent techniques into the tool, so
that the inferred elements can be calculated automatically. Thus,
an inference categorisation could be introduced based on the ac-
curacy and ease of their extraction. Also, in such a way we could
examine the deterioration of quality caused by error propagation in
derivations that demand multi-level chain of extractions. These live
demonstrations are expected to help users attest better the risks
encountered and regain control of their data [20]. It is important
that this enhanced identity-exposure tool is going to be used re-
sponsibly as we acknowledge the related privacy risks that arise
from its use.
For now the tool can be launched locally on a user’s computer.
On-going work is aiming at enabling its access through the web
and developing a mobile application that users could use on their
mobile phone. As a result, the tool will be able to be reached by a
greater range of people allowing us to launch user-based studies
on a larger group of individuals. We are also particularly keen
on exploring how other interested stakeholders perceive our tool,
the risks it identiies and the correlated illustration of the inferred
elements. Hence, we are considering conducting interviews with
executives from companies that provide wearables in the market.
We are positive that our tool could help them to be better informed
about the potential risks that their devices can possibly cause and
take countermeasures against them, acquiring thus the trust of their
customers.
Finally, ongoing work is also focusing on surveying the ethical
considerations that are caused by the possibility of deducing suc-
cessfully signiicant information about users’ identity in this new
heavily connected world. Among the issues that are under invest-
igation are the discrimination efects of users’ decision to remain
unconnected and the questions raised from the existence of such
accumulated superabundant information that may be used either
by the government or by companies to place individuals under
surveillance [2].
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